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Over the last decade the Catholic Church in Cuba has 
experienced a changing relationship with the Castro regime.  
The Church, it seems, has been able to find more space 
within which to operate despite the historically 
significant decades of repression after the 1959 
Revolution.  The Papal Visit of 1998 further enhanced this 
growth of the Church in Cuban society and acted as an 
accelerator of positive change.  This thesis examines 
Church-State relations in Cuba from an international, 
domestic, and individual perspective focusing mainly on 
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 The Cubans who consider themselves religious largely 
define themselves as Roman Catholic.  After 40 years of the 
current regime, societal attitudes, including those toward 
religion, are heavily conditioned by the attitude of 
President Fidel Castro and his ruling regime.  This seems 
to have changed over the last decade.  The 1998 visit by 
Pope John Paul II greatly boosted the public perception 
that that espousing religious faith was once again 
acceptable as well as acting as an accelerant for the 
Catholic Church’s role in Cuba.  This thesis explores the 
growth evident prior to the Papal visit and how recent 
events have changed the pace. 
 The second chapter focuses on the Cuban Church and how 
it has interacted with the government over time.  Over the 
last decade, specifically 1991-98, the Castro government 
has attempted to build bridges to Catholics in Cuba in the 
hopes of maintaining regime strength.  In this thesis, I 
will show that these early 1990s decisions set the stage 
for the Papal visit and show the Cuban government’s 
“willingness” to concede space to the Catholic Church.  I 
will also provide a comparative look at the Church’s 
experiences in other Latin American countries.  This 
section concludes with a review of religiously significant 
events in Cuba over the last two decades and a glimpse of 
Fidel Castro’s personal experiences with religion.  
 The third chapter explores the impact of international 
relations on the Cuban Church.  It begins by discussing the 
importance of the Church within Cuban-US relations.  In 
December 2001, under the new Trade Sanctions Reform and 
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Export Enhancement Act of 2000, the US provided a shipment 
of food to Cuba, the first in nearly 40 years.  The US 
authorized the shipment in response to the devastation 
caused by Hurricane Michelle.  It is within these 
humanitarian efforts that the Church may find greater 
opportunities for a growing influence in Cuba.  This is 
followed by a discussion of relevant domestic factors, 
individual factors, and implications of the Papal visit for 
the Church. Finally, the last section provides a brief 
outline of the visit itself. 
 Chapter four outlines the significant gains of the 
Church in Cuba made possible through the Papal visit.  
Whether it was access to mass media or the ability to hold 
public religious activities the Church has clearly gained 
space in Cuban society.  The greater space cannot be solely 
attributed to the Pope’s visit because his visit came in 
the context of a process that has been developing over many 
years.  This is followed by a section that highlights the 
impact of the Papal visit with respect to both the Cuban 
and Church’s international relations. 
 The concluding chapter reviews the position of the 
Church as left by the Papal visit and some prospects for 
the future.  The indications that civil society in Cuba is 
expanding as well as the implications for the Church’s 















During the attempt to build a new society since the 
Cuban Revolution of 1959, the institution of religion was 
singled out for eradication.  To achieve their goal, the 
authorities implemented a broad spectrum of policies 
targeted against the society’s religious groups.  All 
established churches immediately came under attack, as they 
presented the greatest threat to the new system due to 
their developed and organized infrastructures and their 
upper class membership.1  However despite four decades of an 
atheist, Marxist-Leninist state, religion in its various 
forms continues to thrive.   
The Cubans who consider themselves religious largely 
define themselves as Roman Catholic, although few attend 
mass regularly.  After 40 years of the current regime, 
societal attitudes, including those toward religion, are 
heavily conditioned by the attitude of President Fidel 
Castro and his ruling regime.  This seems to have changed 
over the last decade.  The government’s decision to allow, 
and even provide some support for, the 1998 Papal visit 
greatly boosted the public perception that espousing 
religious faith was again acceptable and it also acted as 
an accelerant for the Church’s role in Cuba. There is a 
greater trend for Church space in Cuba. It now enjoys a 
more prominent role, than in the past.  Why is this the 
                     
1 Pedraza, Teresita. “This Too Shall Pass: The Resistance and Endurance 
of Religion in Cuba”, (Cuban Studies No. 28, University of Pittsburgh 
Press, Pittsburgh PA, 1999) 16. 
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case?  I have chosen the following possible questions for 
this study: 
1. Is what is happening with the Church in 
Cuban society a result of the new post-
Cold War international system?  Or is it 
dependent on Church strength?   
2. Has the change been caused by the 
strength of the Church in international 
affairs?  How does the Church enjoy a 
more prominent role in Cuba? 
3. Are domestic issues in Cuba transforming 
the church and regime relations?  How do 
they differ from other Latin American 
countries experiences with the Catholic 
Church? 
4. Why was the Papal visit so important to 
Cuba? Is President Castro, as an 
individual, driving Cuba’s religious 
policy based on more personal beliefs?   
The Papal visit has left the Catholic Church in Cuba 
in a strengthened position with support and solidarity of 
the universal Church.  Besides the government, the Church 
is the only nationwide organization in Cuba.  Its well-
founded structure of parishes and dioceses make it 
particularly effective at communicating faith and issues to 
the people and the government.  The Church is now in a 
position to play a major role in any effort towards 
national reconciliation or a peaceful transition to 
democracy in Cuba.  This thesis will highlight some of the 
issues that have allowed the Church to gain this position 
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and how it may continue to conduct operations in the 
future.   
B. STUDY FOCUS                                                           
 This thesis will analyze international, domestic, and 
individual factors influencing the Roman Catholic Church 
relations with the Cuban government.  The goal is to 
determine if one or more of these factors are causal of the 
changes observed and to what degree.  Another goal of this 
work is to explore why the Church has “greater space” in 
Cuba than it has in the past. Hopefully this may bring to 
light certain indicators that will assist in answering the 
question of whether or not the Catholic Church can serve as 
a primary agent for social, economic, and political culture 
change in Cuba, or if the Church will merely continue to 
foster a relationship with the current regime and seek 
greater space in the future. 
 In this thesis, I will examine the change in role of 
the Catholic Church in Cuba and how events have led it to 
gain the power, and concessions from the current regime 
that it has so far been able to obtain.  I will begin with 
the 1992 Cuban Constitutional changes that allow greater 
religious freedom and conclude with the Papal visit in 
early 1998.  I intend to analyze the variation in the role 
of the Church by using three different levels of analysis: 
international, domestic, and individual.  My data comes 
from a variety of primary and secondary sources.  I have 
used books, scholarly articles, newspaper articles, web 
sites, and official reports, to determine why Church/State 





   1. Chapter II:  “The Catholic Church in Cuba”.  This 
chapter has three purposes.  First, study the role of the 
Church in Cuba and briefly examine its background. Second, 
study the relationship between the Church and the Castro 
regime.  This section will briefly outline how the Church 
has interacted in the last few decades.  And lastly, 
identify the power and visibility of the Church in Cuba.  
 2. Chapter III:  “Factors Leading to the Papal Visit.”  
This chapter begins by examining US-Cuba relations and the 
significance they hold in molding Cuba’s identity. The next 
section focuses on Cuban domestic factors and how they 
related to the Papal visit. The third section takes a look 
at Fidel Castro and the Pope himself in the hopes of 
identifying motives and goals for the visit. Finally, the 
last section provides an overview of the actual events. 
 3. Chapter IV:  “Church-State Relations after the 
Papal Visit.”  This chapter will look at Church politics 
and Cuban state relations after the Papal visit. 
Specifically, I will use try to explain the greater role of 
the Church in Cuba. I briefly discuss whether or not the 
end of the Cold War was a necessary or sufficient condition 
to allow for greater Church space within the Castro regime.  
I will also examine the implications of the “new working 
relationship” on international relations. 
 4. Chapter V:  “Conclusions.”  Within the quest to 
stay in power, the Cuban government is forming new 
political, economic, and social links that are bringing 
increased complexity to Cuba-Church relations.  What will 
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the future hold?  This chapter will cite observations based 
on the Church’s experiences to date and the position that 
it holds in Cuban society.  I will argue that the Church is 
seeking a gradual evolution of faith and positive change in 
Cuba within the regime’s limits.  Even given its 
limitations, the Church could indeed be quite important to 
Cuba’s future. 
D. FINAL REMARKS 
Finally it is worth mentioning that despite a very  
wide bibliography, covering much literature from the 
relevant period, the information out of Cuba is not fully 
objective. Much has been written that is polemic – either 
pro or anti-Castro. Much has simply not been written, for 






















































II. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN CUBA 
 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE CHURCH IN CUBA AND WORK FOCUS 
The Catholic Church is the largest independent 
institution in Cuba today, but continues to operate under 
significant constraints. The Cuban government continues to 
refuse to allow the church to have independent printing 
press capabilities, to have full access to the media, or to 
establish institutions, such as local schools. 
The Cuban government’s main interaction with religious 
denominations is through the Office of Religious Affairs of 
the Cuban Communist Party.  Also, The Ministry of Interior 
reportedly engages in efforts to control and monitor the 
country’s religious institutions, including surveillance, 
infiltration, and harassment of religious professionals and 
laypersons.2 
This thesis focuses on two distinct time periods.  The 
first period starts in 1992 with the amendment of the Cuban 
Constitution to allow greater religious freedoms and ends 
once the Pope’s plans to visit Cuba are announced. The 
second focuses on the events just prior to, during, and 
after the Pope’s 1998 visit. Although this thesis uses 
various historical examples that are not within these time 
periods they are included in order to assist in the overall 
depiction of the complicated religious affairs in Cuba. I 
choose the word complicated because it does not seem that 
any action taken by the Church in Cuba is not scrutinized 
for a deeper meaning; perhaps not as much now, but almost 
certainly in a historical context.     
                     
2 Clark, Juan. “Religious Repression in Cuba”, (Cuban Living Conditions 
Project, Miami, 1998) 7. 
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Over the last decade, specifically 1991-1998, the 
Castro government has attempted to build bridges to 
Catholics and to other religious communities in Cuba in the 
hopes of maintaining regime strength.  The government of 
Cuba has done this through various policy decisions that 
were either disguised under Marxist doctrine as being “good 
for the country” or in direct response to Church actions, 
but still attributed to state strength. It would be 
difficult to imagine that Fidel Castro has been able to 
stay in power for four decades with a lack of knowledge in 
both political and societal matters. 
In fact, in an essay written by Alfred G. Cuzán, Fidel 
Castro is attributed as having many of the same qualities 
as Machiavelli’s Prince.3 In this work Castro is noted as 
having “raised himself from abject origins to a position of 
undisputed political primacy as conqueror or founder of a 
new regime.”4 Although the parallels between the character 
in Machiavelli’s work and Castro are significant the author 
concludes that the former was not a tyrant, but the latter 
is one.    
In this thesis, I will show that these early 90’s 
decisions, specifically to concede to religious groups or 
withdraw actions planned against religious activities, set 
the stage for the Pope’s 1998 visit and show the Cuban 
governments “willingness” to concede space to the Catholic 
Church. 
The historical background provided in the next section 
will illustrate the historically confrontational relations 
between the Catholic Church and the Castro regime, but will 
                     
3 Cuzán, Alfred G. “Fidel Castro: A Machiavellian Prince?” from 
Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE), 1999, 1.  
4 Cuzán, 1. 
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also show how this relationship has changed, as well as 
relevant recent events.   
 
B. BACKGROUND OF THE CHURCH IN CUBA 
In Cuba the Roman Catholic Church was not strong 
before the 1959 revolution and it was weakened further in 
the decades that followed.5  In 1954, the Havana University 
Catholic Students Association conducted a national survey 
of 4000 people in all six provinces.  It found that 91 
percent of all Cubans had been baptized, but only 50 
percent had received first communion in the Roman Catholic 
Church. Only 24 percent of Roman Catholics attended mass 
once a month and only 16 percent of all marriages were 
formalized in church.  By any standards, this indicates a 
low level of participation, lower than most Latin America 
countries at the time.6    
Following the Cuban Revolution, the large-scale 
emigration of the 1960’s that followed the Cuban Revolution 
weakened the Roman Catholic Church because many of those 
who left Cuba came from the minority of practicing Roman 
Catholics.7 A 1969 survey of Catholic parishes in urban 
Havana projected that by 1972, 50% to 70% of their pre-
Revolutionary membership would have left the island.8 
Moreover, government repression further weakened all 
organized religion.  In September 1961, for example, the 
Cuban government deported 131 priests and religious 
                     
5  Ramet, Pedro. Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies. (Duke 
University Press, London, 1990), 5. 
6 Levine, Daniel H. Ed.  Churches and Politics in Latin America. (Sage 
Publications, London, 1980), 245. 
7 Crahan, Margaret. “Salvation Through Christ or Marx: Religion in 
Revolutionary Cuba”, from Churches and Politics in Latin America. (Sage 
Publications, London, 1980), 246. 
8 Jover, M. Revolutionary Change in Cuba, ed. Carmelo Mesa-Lago 
(University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh PA, 1971), 417. 
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personnel.9  Other priests and nuns were deported, arrested, 
intimidated, or otherwise induced to emigrate.  Among those 
sent to a concentration camp for a period of time was Jaime 
Ortega, today’s Cardinal Archbishop of Havana.10  By the end 
of the 1970’s, probably not more than 2 percent of Cubans 
attended Roman Catholic mass on Sundays.  Although it was 
not illegal to attend mass, many Cubans did not feel the 
risk was worth the associated stigma the Cuban regime 
placed on the faithful.  
A variety of these stigmas included, but were not 
limited to, not being able to attend certain universities 
or train for a competitive career.11 It was not only the 
faithful who were sparse in number. In the 1981 census, 
there were only 212 priests for all Cuba, 40 percent of 
whom lived in the archdiocese of Havana.12    
In recent years, the Cuban government has eased the 
harsher aspects of its repression of religious freedom. In 
1991 it allowed religious adherents to join the Communist 
Party, which is the only legal political entity.  In 1992 
it amended the Constitution to prohibit religious 
discrimination and removed references to “scientific 
materialism,” i.e. atheism, as the basis for the State.13  
The Cuban Constitution of 1992 recognizes the rights 
of citizens to profess and practice any religious belief, 
within the framework of respect for the law.  However, in 
                     
9  Crahan, 246. 
10 Dominguez, Jorge.  Prepared Statement Before the Subcommittee on 
International Relations, House of Representatives 105th Congress, March 
4, 1998. 5. 
11  Bauzá, Vanessa. “Church, Cuba Maintain A Tense Balance”, from The 
South Florida Sun Sentinel (January 26th, 2002). 
12  Dominguez, 5.   
13 Rivera, Mario Antonio. “Issues of Legitimacy and Constitutionalism in 
the Cuban Transition”, Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy 
(ASCE), 1995, 2. 
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law and in practice, the Cuban government places 
restrictions on freedom of religion.  Church and state have 
been constitutionally separate since the early 20th century.   
The Cuban government requires churches and other 
religious groups to register with the provincial Registry 
of Associations within the Ministry of the Interior to 
obtain official recognition. Purportedly, this is not to 
ensure any monitoring by the government, but merely as an 
accounting of citizens activities. 
 
C. THE CUBAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
The Catholic Church has accumulated a wide variety of 
experiences as an actor in Latin American society, and as a 
force for and against democracy.  The Church has outwardly 
opposed, supported, hidden from, or otherwise eluded many a 
country’s government in the hopes of continuing to minister 
to the faithful.14 Of the countries in the region I have 
chosen Chile and Brazil in the hopes of discovering more 
explanations for the Church’s behavior in politics. 
Historically, the Church has supported regimes that 
treated it well based on the assumption that these 
governments, mainly dictators, were able to bring about 
stability and order in their countries.15  In his book, 
Catholicism and Political Development in Latin America, 
Frederick Turner notes that some Latin American autocracies 
appealed to numerous clergymen due to their reform-oriented 
tendencies whereby improving morals in society through 
strict programs.16  He provides as an example the Catholic 
Church’s backing of Fidel Castro’s program against vice and 
                     
14 Turner, Frederick C. Catholicism and Political Development in Latin 
America. (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1971), 88. 
15 Turner, 110. 
16 Ibid, 110. 
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includes a statement from a priest that said, “Cuba before 
Castro seemed the creature of its decadent capitalist 
bourgeoisie.”17  Here the Church won a small victory; 
suppressed decadent activity equals less moral degeneracy, 
which happened to coincide with Catholic doctrine behavior 
objections. But, as Turner points out, the converse, that 
Catholic opposition to authoritarianism has also had a long 
tradition in Latin America, is also true.18  
The experiences of the Catholic Church in Chile have 
significantly influenced the manner in which the Cuban 
Church has tried to forge a relationship with the Castro 
regime.  In his book, The Church and Politics in Chile, 
Brian Smith begins by describing some of the changes and 
challenges that the Catholic Church experienced and faced 
after Vatican II.19  Most importantly for this work is his 
observation that,  
 major transformations in official Catholic  
 positions have provided the opportunity for  
 greater integration of religious and secular  
 values and have shifted the moral weight of  
 the Church away from legitimizing the status  
 quo toward an increased promotion of equity  
 and freedom20 
This is particularly noteworthy because it draws a 
parallel to the situation that the Roman Catholic Church 
has been facing in Cuba since the early 1990s and 
increasingly since the Papal visit. 
                     
17 Turner, 110. See also Óscar Tiseyra, Cuba Marxista Vista Por un 
Católico, (Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez, 1964), p. 167. 
18 Turner, 111. 
19 Smith, Brian H. The Church and Politics in Chile. (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton NJ, 1982), 3. 
20 Smith, 5. The author also states that these pronouncements contain 
implications across social, economic, and political lines with regards 
to the choices of the Church’s membership, which constitutes 
approximately one-sixth of the world’s population. 
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After carefully describing in detail the Catholic 
Church as a complex religious organization, and providing 
an in-depth analysis of the Church’s challenges in Chile 
from 1920-1970, Smith examines the Chilean Church’s 
operations in a Marxist-dominated political setting.21 Some 
of his observations include: (1) – Marxism and Catholicism 
both have ruled out long-term coexistence, (2) – Both sides 
have discovered interest in reducing tensions between the 
two, and (3) – A need for coexistence and cooperation at 
the external policy level.22 Here we can see that the Cuban 
Church appears to fit into all three observations; at least 
in establishing clearly what either actor in Church-State 
relations is willing to admit.  
Although we can draw some similarities between the 
two, some of the Church’s experiences in Chile under the 
Allende regime have not been similar to the experiences in 
Cuba under Castro.  This is based on the fact that Cuba has 
yet to experience a movement such as the Christians for 
Socialism (CpS), the radical group that operated in Chile 
from 1971-73, wherein close to twelve percent of the 
priests in the country decided to forge a synthesis with 
Marxism.23  But, as Smith points out, the CpS did make 
strides towards re-examining the universal Church’s role as 
a political institution.  As discussed in later sections, 
we see how this role is important to the Cuban Church when 
dealing with the Castro regime and how Castro has 
personally allowed the Church to act as his international 
mediator.    
                     
21 Smith, 165. 
22 Smith, 165-169. 
23 Smith, 232-257. 
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With the exception of clerical involvement in 
politics, the Catholic Church’s experiences in Cuba have 
been significantly more comparable to those in Brazil than 
in any other Latin American country. In his book, The 
Church in Brazil, Thomas Bruneau concluded that the Roman 
Catholic Church was promoting structural change and 
assisting a more general process in Brazilian society.24  
But that no single actor, to include the church, would 
bring on “the revolution” needed for radical change.25 The 
same appears to be true for the Church in Cuba. 
The Church in Brazil focused on the lower class, which 
is similar to what the Church in Cuba appears to have been 
doing in the recent past. Throughout its history the Cuban 
Church has gone through various levels of conflict and 
cooperation with the Castro regime.  With this in mind, the 
Church has been mindful of its activities especially in 
regards to membership, too many upper class arise suspicion 
and increase likelihood of government involvement. But with 
the changing of the state from an atheist one to secular, 
in 1992, the Church in Cuba was granted more space in 
society with which to operate.   
Like the 1998 visit to Cuba, the Papal visit to Brazil 
in 1980 assisted the Church in its development in societal 
terms.  First, the duration of the visit, 12 days, and the 
first for Brazil, underlined the importance of the country 
for the Vatican.26  Although not as long, the Papal visit to 
Cuba signified the Vatican’s willingness to overlook 
reported abuses in order to allow the Pope to preach to the 
faithful. Secondly, his visit generated tremendous 
                     
24 Bruneau, Thomas C. The Church in Brazil. (University of Texas Press, 
Austin, 1982), 154. 
25 Bruneau, 154-155. 
26 Bruneau, 157. 
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enthusiasm amongst the population.  Especially here, we see 
a tremendous similarity in the way that the Cuban society 
responded to the Papal visit, and how religious freedoms 
have been viewed since. Thirdly, the trip was well planned 
and very intense, with the Pope traveling great distances, 
making dozens of speeches, and over twenty homilies 
throughout the country.27  Although not as intense in Cuba, 
eleven speeches and homilies with visits to four cities, it 
was by no means an insignificant event. Perhaps by taking 
into account the difference in duration of the two visits, 
the difference in population concentration of the two 
countries, and the age of the Pope, eighteen years between 
the two visits, we can understand the disparity in numbers. 
Although the Cuban Church shares similarities with 
both countries, further experiences are necessary to 
accurately predict which model it follows, if any at all.  
For example, the Church in Cuba shares the experiences of 
Chile with regards to operating under a repressive regime, 
but it lacks the open clerical support of the government.  
Also, the Brazilian model reinforces several factors that 
make a Papal visit important, such as the fact that the 
Cuban Catholic Church has to compete with a myriad of 
religions for members, but the Basic Christian Community, 
present in Brazil, is absent in Cuba.28 Even though the 
Cuban Church does not fit either model exactly, the more 
similar experiences it has the greater the potential exists 




                     
27 Bruneau, 157. 
28 Bruneau, 10. 
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D. THE CUBAN CHURCH IN THE 1980s & 1990s  
A religious revival began in Cuba during the 1980’s.  
As a proportion of births nationwide, the percentage of 
infants baptized rose from 15-20 percent in the late 1970’s 
to 25-30 percent by the mid-1980’s.   
It seems that sometime in the mid 1980’s the Catholic 
Church decided to work within the Castro regime in order to 
ensure small gains rather than continue to publicly 
criticize it and gain nothing.29  The church still had no 
access to the newspapers and radio stations Cubans read or 
heard.  But that may not have necessarily reflected what 
the regime believed it was providing to the faithful.   
In 1984, Castro attended a nationally televised church 
service during the visit of U.S. political activist 
Reverend Jesse Jackson. The following year, several U.S. 
Catholic bishops were allowed to visit the island and later 
hosted their Cuban counterparts in return. In 1985, Castro 
also met separately with the bishops of the Catholic Church 
and the leaders of the Protestant churches to discuss the 
religious situation. In the same year, the Cuban Communist 
Party elevated the status of its Office of Religious 
Affairs, making it an independent department. In addition, 
the government requested the Catholic Church’s assistance 
in mediating the release and resettlement of several 
political prisoners.30 
This trend continued throughout the 1980s as the Cuban 
government began granting foreign priests and nuns long-
term visas. The Church began asking for more space in Cuban 
                     
29  Preston, Julie. “Cuba, Churches Slowly Improve Ties.” The Washington 
Post. (May 3,1987) A21. 
30 News in Review, “The Pope in Cuba: Church and State”, (March 1998) 
accessed from 
<http://www.cbc.ca/insidecbc/newsinreview/mar98/popecuba/revolutn.htm> 
on February 13, 2002. 
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society and the opportunity to play a larger role within 
the traditional Catholic areas of education, charity, and 
public worship.  
In February 1986, the first Catholic Congress since 
the revolution was held in Havana.31  This is significant 
because it begins to lay the groundwork for future Church 
space that the government would allow the Catholic clergy 
in Cuban society.32  It had been prepared carefully through 
work in every parish and every diocese.   
That Catholic Congress broke new ground by criticizing 
government policies.  It called attention to the 
discrimination in job promotions that Catholics suffered.  
It proclaimed the right of all Catholics to serve Cuba as 
Christians.  It protested the desacralization of former 
public holidays, such as Christmas or Holy Week.  The 
church called attention to “moral deficiencies” in 
contemporary Cuba and doubted that official atheism could 
be called scientific and it objected to its insertion in 
school programs.33  The church asserted as a national goal 
“seeking to reduce progressively, insofar as possible, the 
excessive dependence on external aid,” then from the Soviet 
Union.34 
Subsequently, the Roman Catholic Bishops continued to 
criticize Cuban government policy on major issues despite 
recent concessions. For example, in 1991, reacting to a 
                     
31 Quigley, Thomas E. “The Catholic Church in Cuba”, from Catholicism 
and Politics in Communist Societies. (Duke University Press, London, 
1990), 296. 
32 Quigley, Thomas E.  U.S. Economic and Trade Policy Toward Cuba. 
Prepared Testimony of Thomas E. Quigley, Policy Advisor on Latin 
American and Caribbean Affairs, United States Catholic 
Conference; U.S. Congress House Committee on Ways and Means, 
Subcommittee on Trade, (May 7, 1998) 3. 
33  Dominguez, 2. 
34  Ibid, 7. 
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government-sponsored assault on political dissidents, the 
bishops issued a statement warning of the risk of "a 
dangerous slide toward hatred and revenge." The bishops 
welcomed the Communist Party's decision to allow believers 
into the Party, but skeptically added that if the Party 
continued its dogmatic stance of atheism and materialism, 
"it is morally impossible for a Catholic to belong to such 
a party."35 
In the 1990s, important changes began to occur in the 
church as an institution.  The Church was becoming more 
‘Cubanized’ which was reflected in its younger membership 
and showing more local roots than ever before in its 
history on the island.36 But none of this means much without 
examining the regime under which the Church operates.  
With regards to the Castro regime much depends on the 
charismatic leader himself.  In his conversations with Frei 
Betto, who wrote Fidel and Religion, Castro stated that, 
“Even in the church's own clashes, there was a lot of 
violence. There was violence against the church and the 
church also applied violence to a considerable extent. This 
is why it's not strange for violence to surface in clashes 
between the revolutionary political movement and the 
church”.37  Along these lines, Rev. Brian Clough, chairman 
of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Toronto’s ecumenical 
commission, said “definite problems,” that include a subtle 
discrimination against the Roman Catholic Church, exist in 
                     
35 Clark, 8. 
36  DeYoung, Karen. “Cuban Dissidents Wage Lonely Battle” from The 
Washington Post. (July 16, 2000) A1. 
37  Betto, Frei. Fidel and Religion. (Simon and Schuster, New York, 
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Cuba.  However, Clough said significant changes are taking 
place under Castro and “we should seize the moment”.38 
For example, in Frei Betto’s book, regarding Castro 
and religion, Castro is quoted as advocating “relations of 
collaboration” between the church and state, the Catholic 
Church saw a “not spectacular, but real growth”.39  This 
sentiment was echoed at the time by Jose Carneado, the 
Director of the Office of Religious Affairs, who said, “We 
are advancing slowly” when speaking of church-state 
relations40.   
Over the next few years the Catholic Church and the 
Cuban government held several meetings involving mainly 
Bishops and those in the Communist Party who handled 
religious issues.  The next step of changing the Cuban 
Constitution, although a legal one, further enhanced the 
viability of freedom of religion on the island nation.  
Historically the Catholic Church in Cuba has been 
relatively weak.  The Castro regime’s policies for state 
suppression of religious activities and organization’s 
members often stunted growth entirely. But the Cuban Church 
is not similar to the others in Latin America because it 
retains a high degree of visibility internationally as the 
only structured organization in Cuba outside of the 
government.  Due to its precarious position and years of 
moving in small steps, the Church in Cuba began to exhibit 
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III. FACTORS LEADING TO THE POPE’S VISIT 
 
A. IMPACT OF CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ON THE 
CUBAN CATHOLIC CHURCH 
 In order to discuss the role of the Cuban Church 
relations with the Cuban state it is necessary to include 
the United States as an actor in this relationship.  In the 
recent past, the Church has acted as a sort of mediator 
between the two entities, although specific examples are 
difficult to find. But, Castro does not view a concession 
to the Vatican as an acquiescence to American policy, even 
though what he may be conceding to is exactly what the U.S. 
wants him to do.  
This relationship between the U.S. and Cuba leaves the 
Church, specifically the Pope, in an increasingly more 
important role.  Not only is he viewed as the spiritual 
leader of all Catholics worldwide, but also as a steward of 
peace and understanding for all nations. The Papal visit to 
Cuba can be viewed as a way that Cuba, as a nation, tried 
to bring itself closer to the Church both locally and 
internationally in an effort to legitimize its efforts. Or 
perhaps the Papal visit was the accelerant necessary to 
prepare the Cuban Church for a post-Castro Cuba. After all, 
the Papal visit did bring with it a higher order of 
magnitude, with regards to the Church’s significance in 
Cuba, than was present before. 
  
B. THE ROLE OF US-CUBA RELATIONS 
The relationship between the United States and Cuba 
for the last 40 years has been marked by tension and 
confrontations. The United States recognized the new Cuban 
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government, headed by Fidel Castro, on January 7, 1959.41  
However, bilateral relations deteriorated rapidly as the 
regime expropriated U.S. properties and moved towards 
adoption of a one-party Marxist-Leninist system. As a 
result, the United States established an embargo on Cuba in 
October 1960 and broke diplomatic relations the following 
January. Tensions between the two governments peaked during 
the April 1961 "Bay of Pigs" invasion and the October 1962 
missile crisis. During his visit to Cuba the Pope requested 
that the embargo be ended. 
In the 1980’s the focus of friction in U.S.-Cuban 
relations shifted to include immigration, when a migration 
crisis unfolded. In April 1980 an estimated ten thousand 
Cubans stormed the Peruvian embassy in Havana seeking 
political asylum. Eventually, the Cuban government allowed 
125,000 Cubans to illegally depart for the United States 
from the port of Mariel.42  
The 1990’s witnessed another migration crisis that set 
back U.S.-Cuban relations. When demonstrations fueled by 
food shortages and prolonged unannounced blackouts erupted 
in Havana in August 1994, the Cuban Government responded by 
allowing some 30,000 Cubans to set sail for the United 
States, many in unsafe boats and rafts, which resulted in a 
number of deaths at sea. Although some Cubans did 
eventually manage to make it to the U.S. in search of a new 
life, many were unskilled and added to the U.S.’s 
unemployed statistics.43   
                     
41 U.S. State Department.  Official Policy on Cuba: Internet Resources 
at <http://www.state.gov>, accessed from 21NOV-12DEC01. 
42  U.S. State Department.  Official Policy on Cuba: Internet Resources 
at <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/cuba/migration.html> accessed 
January 2002. 
43 Navarette, Ruben. “Cuban Boy Highlights Inconsistency in Immigration 
Law”, from Arizona Republic (Cambridge MA, January 30, 2000), 2. 
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On February 24, 1996, further complicating relations, 
the Cuban military shot down two U.S. registered civil 
aircraft in international airspace, killing three U.S. 
citizens and one U.S. resident. Immediately after this 
incident, Congress and President Clinton passed the Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, also known as the 
Libertad Act. The legislation codified the U.S. trade 
embargo into law and imposed additional sanctions on the 
Cuban regime. This act was criticized publicly by the local 
Cuban Church and did not elicit known retribution. 
Generally speaking, Cuba experienced an indigenous 
revolution led by a charismatic leader, and was rapidly 
transformed into a communist state well before a ruling 
communist party was formed and it has withstood the active 
efforts of the U.S. to destabilize its government.44 In 
contrast to the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union, 
communist Cuba has outlived its former sponsors.  
The Castro regime has since survived in large part 
because of the hard currency generated by foreign tourism, 
foreign investments (concentrated in hotels, oil, and 
mining sectors), and remittances from abroad.  Since the 
fall of the Soviet Union, Cuba has made careful and 
calculated steps not to alienate the U.S. further and has 
begun the long process of improving relations with other 
Latin American countries and the European Union.45 
                                                             
Accessed from <http://www.navarrette.com/arizona/000130.html> on 
January 12th, 2002. 
44 Gonzalez, Edward and Thomas S. Szayna. “Cuba and Lessons from Other 
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Period”, (The Canadian Foundation of the Americas (FOCAL), February 25, 
2000, accessed from <http://www.focal.ca>, January 2002), 3. 
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In October 2000, the U.S. Congress passed legislation, 
later signed by the President into law, which changed the 
U.S.-Cuba trade relationship by enacting certain exceptions 
from U.S. sanctions legislation for agricultural and 
medical exports.46 This legislation, the Trade Sanctions 
Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, basically allows 
the sale of items for humanitarian aid purposes only.  
In December 2001, a freighter carrying the first 
commercial shipment of food from the United States to Cuba 
in nearly 40 years docked in the port of Havana.47  The U.S. 
authorized the commercial shipment in response to the 
devastation caused by Hurricane Michelle to the Caribbean 
island in November 2001.  Both Washington and Havana have 
said the sale was a one-off due to the special 
circumstances brought about by the hurricane.  The shipment 
has sparked a heated debate in the United States between 
the growing lobby that wants to see the US trade embargo 
lifted and the influential Cuban-American community in 
Miami that says the food will only bolster Castro's 
communist government. Cuban Foreign Investment Minister 
Marta Lomas said the shipment was an important first step 
in easing US sanctions.  "We will have to wait and see if 
there is a second or a third step - we don't know," she 
said. "One day, the blockade will have to end, and we will 
have normal relations." 48 
                     
46   United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Foreign Agricultural 
Service (FAS), November 2000. Accessed from 
<http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/cuba/cuba-faq.html> on March 10th, 2002. 
47 British Broadcasting Channel (BBC), “US food arrives in Cuba”, 
December 16th, 2001). Accessed from 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_1714000/1714776
.stm> on March 10th, 2002. 
48  BBC, “US Food Arrives in Cuba”, 2. 
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Within these humanitarian efforts is where the Church 
will find the greatest opportunity for a growing influence 
in Cuba.  For example, if the Cuban government does not 
agree with a particular cost or diplomatic request 
associated with a shipment of food or supplies, it can be 
vulnerable to the Church’s efforts for concession.  The 
term vulnerable is not meant to imply weakness, but rather 
the opportunity for the local Church to place itself in a 
position of leadership by presenting the citizens needs to 
the government in a manner that does not appear to be 
aggressively demanding or threatening. By doing this, the 
Church will have accomplished its mission of stewardship 
while enhancing the level of Church-State relations. 
 
C. CUBAN DOMESTIC FACTORS AFFECTING CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Castro 
took steps to internalize much of Cuba’s economy.  Cuba’s 
historic reliance on foreign investors and monetary 
assistance from other countries needed to be halted.  
Castro began to implement a strategy known as import 
substitution industrialization which in theory would 
eliminate excessive reliance on commodity exports, or 
sugar in Cuba’s case.  By promoting the development of 
Cuba’s industrial sector, Castro hoped to substitute 
domestically manufactured goods for imported ones.  
Coupled with this push towards industrialization, steps 
were taken to capitalize the socialist economy.  One of 
the steps taken was the opening up of the economy to self-
employment, which up to this time had been prohibited, but 
overlooked, by the government.   
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Castro knew that these changes would not immediately 
provide the economic assistance he needed for the vitality 
of the nation’s economy so he began to eye the Church as a 
possible suitor to rid his socio-economic woes.  Perhaps 
the largest non-governmental organization in the world, the 
Catholic Church has stood for centuries in the 
international community with a wide expanse of influence in 
all realms of life.  Considering the history of the Church 
in Cuba, Castro realized that based on the pre-existing 
conditions, the Catholic Church offered the best way of 
surviving the tumultuous post-Soviet period.  However, 
something would have to change for relations between the 
Church and communist Cuba to improve to the point of 
serving Castro’s purpose. 
The Castro regime seems to be undergoing a slow 
process of political decay set in motion by the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the economic crisis that ensued after 
1991.  As a consequence, Cuba is being transformed from a 
totalitarian to a post-totalitarian or authoritarian state 
that is less driven by ideology, less capable of mobilizing 
the populace, and less in control of all aspects of Cuban 
life.49  Even though it is still strong, the tight grip of 
the state had begun to loosen over society.  
Cubans are no longer heavily dependent upon the state 
due to the contraction of the state-run economy.  This has 
led to a greater increase in black market operations, legal 
and illegal self-employment, and other illicit activities 
in order for Cubans to survive.50   
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As government control has weakened, works by banned 
authors are now available on the black market.  For 
example, Roberto Rodriguez-Tejera, director of Radio Marti, 
said Cubans on the island are very interested in the Dalai 
Lama because books about him have been distributed through 
the Black Market. They are also interested in Martin Luther 
King Jr. and Ghandi.51  ``These personalities have a 
tremendous importance because of the message of civil 
disobedience,'' he said. ``It shows that they have a route 
to express themselves politically, but it doesn't include 
violence.''52  This also shows interest in religion and 
competition with the Church over followers. 
Despite suffering banishment and repression, human 
rights and dissident groups repeatedly reemerge in newly 
and sometimes more vocal reconstituted groups.53 José Miguel 
Vivanco, executive director for Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
Americas division, called on the Pope "to address a broad 
range of human rights violations that affect the Cuban 
population, regardless of their religion."54 
As of yet, the government has not decided to 
forcefully dispose of all opposition.55  This is likely due 
to the reality that these groups present no “viable” threat 
to the stability of the regime and are seen as mere 
nuisances by the Cuban government.  However, should the 
dissidents become organized and gain greater support, the 
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government would most certainly move against them in a more 
decisive fashion, even though such actions would incur 
severe domestic and international costs for the regime.  
Whereas many religious groups had also been carefully 
watched, penetrated, and in some cases, closed down by the 
state, the state permitted, what Gillian Gunn called, an 
“explosive growth” in nongovernmental organizations after 
1989.56 She also reported that approximately 2,200 so-called 
NGOs, including religious ones, were registered with the 
government by the end of 1994.57  
But organizations whose goals are deemed to be in 
violation of the constitution or whose activities encroach 
on those of the state are denied legal status by the 
Ministry of Justice.58  Subsequently, no opposition 
political parties or human rights organizations have been 
registered as NGOs. 
In late 1993, the bishops issued another pastoral 
letter giving a detailed assessment of Cuba's economic and 
political situation. The letter decried the "exclusive and 
all-encompassing nature of the government's ideology, 
restrictions imposed on freedom, excessive control 
exercised by state security organizations, the large number 
of prisoners, and discrimination based on political, 
philosophical, or religious beliefs" as well as 
'intolerance, habitual surveillance, and repression." The 
bishops also reaffirmed their condemnation of the U.S. 
embargo. They called for dialogue among Cubans as "a way 
for promoting understanding among all to build a 
                     
56  Gunn, Gillian. Cuba’s NGOs: Government Puppets or Seeds of Civil 
Society? (Washington D.C., Georgetown University, Cuba Briefing Paper 
Series, No. 7, February 1995), 6. 
57  Gunn, 7. 
58  Gunn, 3. 
 28 
 
dignifying, peaceful future," and they warned against the 
"endless spiral of violence" that popular revolt would set 
off.59 
The Catholic Church has continued to expand its role 
and presence in Cuban society. In July of 1994 a government 
boat sank a hijacked tugboat attempting to flee to the 
United States, resulting in the death of approximately 
forty people. Archbishop of Havana Jaime Ortega publicly 
lamented the action and asked for a full investigation. 
During the 1994 summer rafter crisis, the Church encouraged 
the government to initiate a dialogue with the United 
States and called for a focus on the "fundamental causes" 
of the problem.60 
They criticized from the pulpit the Cuban Air Force’s 
shoot down of unarmed civilian aircraft over international 
waters in February 1996.  And they called for changes that 
would enable citizens to participate freely in national 
politics and permit them to associate with each other 
freely for those purposes.  It should also be mentioned 
that the Bishops have also criticized the U.S. embargo and 
associated policies on Cuba since their first pastoral 
letter on this subject was published in 1969.61  But it is 
not only the Bishops who have had a role in church-state 
relations or the religious revival that was taking shape in 
Cuba; the Vatican has also played a significant role. 
The thaw in the relations between the church and state 
in Cuba became more pronounced following Castro’s visit to 
                     
59  Malone, Shawn. “Conflict, Coexistence, and Cooperation: Church-State 
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the Vatican in November 1996.62  Two particularly noteworthy 
gestures followed this trip.  First, the Cuban authorities, 
changing a longstanding policy, issued entry visas to 40 
foreign priests and nuns.  Second, the official press 
published the summary of a communiqué released by Catholic 
bishops, something almost without precedence. 
As result, the Catholic Church experienced a 
remarkable resurgence of its popularity and influence.  Not 
only the old, but also the young attended religious 
services in growing numbers.63  These growing numbers seemed 
to be an indication of the faithful preparing for a visit 
from their spiritual leader. 
 
D. INDIVIDUAL FACTORS  
In the hopes of understanding why the Papal visit was 
allowed to take place and why it was such a significant 
event it is necessary to try and ascertain, or perhaps 
assume, the motives of Fidel Castro and Pope John Paul II.  
It is not easy to assume correctly why President 
Castro invited Pope John Paul II to visit Cuba.  It is 
easier to tell why the Pope did visit: the Pope went to 
pray with Cuba’s Roman Catholics, seeking to give them 
strength and hope under difficult circumstances, and to 
negotiate a better deal for the church to do its work.64  In 
exchange, the Pope’s only promise was probably that he 
would speak out against Cuba’s international isolation and 
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any attempts to deepen it and since this was a previously 
established position it cost the Pope little.65 
We can only speculate that Castro had some specific 
short-term goals and perhaps some vague long term ones as 
well.  One goal may have been to elicit a critique of U.S. 
policy or perhaps strengthen his credentials as a leader 
who “respects human rights”, especially religious ones.  In 
reality, Castro most likely bet that the already weak 
church would remain weak, that Cubans would greet the Pope 
and perhaps attend a few masses in the weeks that followed, 
but that the church’s reach would remain as limited in the 
future as it had been in the past.  With intentions that 
are not as confusing as Castro’s, the Pope most likely 
wished that his visit acted as an accelerator of social 
transformation, a means to empower Cubans to do more, and 
effectively, what they have begun to do on their own: to 
express their religious beliefs, and to claim actively 
their right to do so.  
In an interview given in 1985, Castro commented that 
there really were not that many differences between the 
ideals of the Revolution and the Church.  “When, for 
example, the Church develops to the spirit of sacrifice and 
the spirit of austerity, and when the Church raises 
humility, we also raised exactly the same when we say that 
to have of a revolutionary it is the disposition to the 
sacrifice, the austere and modest life”.66   This is quite a 
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shift from the initial position that the state took in 
assuming the Marxist embracement of atheism.  
While it may seem inconsistent with Castro’s 
statements concerning the Church thirty years earlier, his 
ability to mold the beliefs of his listeners through the 
use of his oratory skills and charisma enabled him to pull 
off the blatant shift in ideological doctrine while 
maintaining his grips on the power.  Fortunately for 
Castro, the ploy worked.  The Pope did eventually visit and 
economic assistance from the Church began to flow into 
Cuba. But we cannot limit every religious event to the Pope 
and Fidel Castro.  
Several prominent Catholics in the U.S. have also 
added to the religious debate regarding the island nation.  
In 2000, Archbishop McCarrick, Chairman of the Committee on 
International Policy, issued some six statements on Cuba; 
the U.S. Catholic Conference gave Congressional testimony 
on two occasions and staff made several public 
presentations, visited Cuba twice, and published articles 
on Cuba.67 
In his letter last September to the House and 
Senate conferees on the Agricultural Appropriations 
Bill, Cardinal Law made the following points: 
• The Catholic Bishops of Cuba are under no 
illusion that the end of the sanctions 
imposed by our government will usher in a 
time of economic prosperity for their 
people. They do know, however, that 
retaining the sanctions continues to hurt 
only the most vulnerable sectors of that 
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society, and provides the regime with 
propaganda advantages it does not deserve.68 
• In his historic visit to Cuba in 1998, Pope 
John Paul II characterized "the economic 
measures imposed from outside the country," 
that is, the United States embargo against 
Cuba, as ‘both unjust and morally 
unacceptable.' It is time to leave aside a 
policy that, whatever moral justification it 
may once have had, has clearly outlived its 
purpose.69 
In summary, despite whatever motives Castro withheld 
and the ones the Pope preached, the state of religious 
affairs in Cuba reached new heights with the Papal visit.  
As an individual the Pope has cleared the way for a greater 
sense of religious freedom; as a religious leader he has 
transferred the courage to do so upon the faithful.  Time 
will allow us to see what the faithful Roman Catholic 
individuals on the island will do in the future.     
 
E. THE VISIT ITSELF  
In January 1998, Pope John Paul II made a historic 
five-day trip to Cuba.  The Pope celebrated public Masses 
in front of hundreds of thousands of persons in several 
cities, which were televised nationally.  In his 11 
discourses while in the country, the Pope emphasized the 
need to allow fundamental freedoms, to respect human 
rights, and to foster the development of independent civil 
society.  During this visit the Cuban government released 
some 300 prisoners from jails across the island, including 
a little over 100 political prisoners.   
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After being formally welcomed to Cuba by Fidel 
Castro, the Pope began preparations for his first major 
public event: a Mass in the city of Santa Clara scheduled 
for the next morning.  In his opening remarks the Pope said 
he was visiting Cuba as “a pilgrim of love, of truth, and 
of hope.” Due to the Pope’s age and health a group of 
children carried a basket of Cuban soil to him so that he 
could hold it up to his lips and kiss it, a customary 
welcoming gesture for the Pope on his international 
journeys. 
 Throughout his visit John Paul II tried to stay away 
from overt political themes and constantly emphasized that 
his trip was pastoral in nature intended only to assist in 
strengthening the Catholic Church and faithful in Cuba.  He 
expressed his admiration for Cubans who had retained a 
strong faith despite their years of living under the 
religiously repressive regime.  
 The Pope, however, was not able to escape all 
political themes. During a brief meeting with reporters on 
the way to Havana, John Paul II urged the United States “to 
change” the long-standing economic embargo imposed on Cuba 
after Castro took power.70  The Pope also urged President 
Castro’s government to end its monopoly on education and 
allow the return of Catholic schools. 
 The Pope’s visit was visibly enthusiastic as measured 
by the crowds to which he professed. During his final Mass 
the Pope called for peace and justice, which prompted 
chants of “freedom” from among a crowd of tens of thousands 
in Havana’s Revolution Square.71 When he called for freedom 
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of conscience, “the basis and foundation of all other human 
rights”, he was answered by a chant “the Pope wants us all 
free.”72 
 With this visit the Pope it seems that the Pope 
accomplished what he set out to do. He brought the 
Christian message to the faithful in Cuba, he provided a 
greater example of faith and hope than was present before, 























                     





































IV. CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS AFTER PAPAL VISIT 
 
A. GAINS FOR THE CUBAN CHURCH FROM THE PAPAL VISIT  
Regarding the Church’s more tangible gains from the 
Papal visit, it is more useful to talk about greater 
“space” rather than greater “freedoms,” as the latter may 
incorrectly imply a permanent or guarantee that does not 
exist.73  With a few notable exceptions, the 1992 
Constitution being one of them, very few state concessions 
have been followed by legislation making the changes 
permanent.  Most of the freedoms that the Church enjoys are 
currently considered to be privileges rather than rights in 
the mind of the Cuban government.74   
For example, in the months prior to the Papal visit 
the Cuban government authorized the granting of 59 visas 
for priests and nuns to enter the country as religious 
workers.  That is an important concession for a Church that 
is severely understaffed.  The continued presence of these 
workers, however, depends on the periodic renewal of their 
visas, which is completely at the discretion of government 
authorities.75  
The Catholic Church has also made gains in the area of 
access to mass media.  Both prior to and during the visit, 
the Church’s access to the state media was much greater 
then ever before.  Never in the history of the revolution 
had a Cuban religious leader appeared on national 
television, as Cardinal Jaime Ortega did in December 1997.76  
                     
73 Malone, Testimony before the Committee on International Relations 
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Slow Progress”, The Associated Press. (May 17, 1998) 1. 
75 Betancourt, Ernesto F. “Cuba: Bringing the Background to the 
Foreground”,  (Freedom House 1997) 12. 
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Never had a Catholic mass been broadcast to the nation, yet 
all four papal masses were broadcast live.  There is, 
however, no guarantee or agreement regarding future Church 
media access. 
Although the Church was required to obtain permission 
for doing so, and despite complications on a few occasions, 
it did hold roughly a dozen open-air masses in preparation 
for the papal visit.77  In addition, the government allowed 
the Pope to hold all four masses in large public spaces, 
perhaps the only mass gatherings since 1959 not focused on 
the Revolution.78 
In December 1998, the Cuban government announced that 
henceforth citizens would be allowed to celebrate Christmas 
as an official holiday.79  The holiday had been cancelled, 
ostensibly to spur the sugar harvest in 1969, and restored 
in 1997 as part of the preparations for the Pope’s visit.  
The visit that some in authorities say led to “new freedoms 
for the Catholic Church.”   
In order to discuss new freedoms for the Catholic 
Church in Cuba we need to focus on Malone’s concept of 
“conditional gains”.80  The Church has not gained any new 
guaranteed freedoms in the recent past.  It has, however, 
gained greater space and a higher profile in Cuban society, 
both of which are important.   
Most significantly, the Church made tremendous gains 
in public visibility through the Pope’s visit, and those 
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gains are irrevocable.81  Although publicity on the island 
was less than hoped for in the preparatory stage, the 
Church has never had a higher profile on the island at any 
point in history, before or after the Revolution.82  In 
addition to state media exposure, preparations for the 
visit spurred local parishes to “re-evangelize” their 
neighborhoods, going door to door to explain not only the 
visit but also Catholicism in general.83   
The Church has expressed impatience at having to 
request permission in areas that it considers inalienable 
rights, but it has also indicated satisfaction with the 
case-by-case progress that has been made.84  That 
ambivalence accurately reflects the overall situation, in 
which the Church has gained far more space than most would 
ever have thought possible, yet it maintains that space at 
the discretion of the government.85  
The greater space and gains that the Catholic Church 
earned in Cuba were not due solely to the Pope’s visit. 
While he was certainly able to accelerate the pace of 
change, the Pope’s visit came in the context of a process 
that has been developing over many years.  As previously 
mentioned, at least as early as 1986, the Church has been 
active in pursuing a greater role in Cuban society and 
seeking more space in which to operate.  The Pope left 
behind an extremely capable group of Cuban bishops who not 
only initiated this process, but also remain on the island 
to continue it.86 
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The Church’s growing number of members is also a 
positive sign.  Although active Catholics are estimated to 
number only roughly 5 percent of the population at present, 
it is harder for the government to reject Church requests 
as that segment of Cuban society grows.87  During the past 
decade, masses have gone from virtually always empty to 
virtually always full, so the trend has been clearly and 
dramatically upward.   
Within the government, there are anecdotal indications 
that the opening for the Church has gone as far as possible 
without generating backlash among the hard-line sectors of 
the government and the party.88  But it is natural that 
there would be a trial period during a time of such radical 
change, and such a period may even be necessary, both to 
allow society to absorb the changes and to prevent a hard-
line backlash.   
Many believe that the Pope’s agenda in Cuba was to use 
the Church to open political space so that civil society 
might become stronger, much as occurred after his visit to 
Poland.89  The phrase, “do not be afraid,” was thus often 
repeated during his three masses.  On the other hand, 
unlike the Church in Poland, the Catholic Church in Cuba 
has always been relatively weak to the extent that its 
ability to empower civil society may be limited.  But the 
limited influence in such a closed society is not without 
merit. 
In Cuba, the state remains as arbitrary and repressive 
as ever, notwithstanding the plea by Pope John Paul II.  A 
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year after the Pope’s visit, Fidel Castro celebrated his 
regime’s fortieth anniversary in power, giving him the 
dubious distinction of being Latin America’s longest 
lasting dictator.  The Communist Party monopolizes 
political power and does not tolerate open opposition, 
peaceful or otherwise.  As José Miguel Vivanco of Human 
Rights Watch in the Americas has noted, “The harassment 
against dissidents, human rights activists or anyone else 
attempting to exercise the most basic rights of association 
and expression continues exactly the same”.90 
But the Catholic Church has seen more space open up 
for itself despite all the factors to the contrary.  The 
government has granted some limited concessions to the 
Church in the year since the Pope’s visit, including 
selected access to the general population through a few 
radio stations. But in general, Cuba’s civil society 
remains in a state of infancy.91 
One example of these limited concessions occurred just 
before Holy Week, April 22-29, 2000, government officials 
informed Catholic Church officials that no processions 
would be allowed.  When the Church made this information 
public, state officials changed their position and informed 
Church officials that Churches that had previously 
requested permission to hold a procession could do so.92  
This demonstrates that the Church clearly has far greater 
space in Cuban society at present than perhaps anyone would 
have ever thought possible even a decade ago. 
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The space available to the Church will depend to some 
degree on the balance of power within the Cuban government 
and the various factors affecting that balance of power.  
Despite Fidel Castro’s very strong personal influence over 
events, there are in fact hard-line and reformist sectors 
within the party and the government.  To the extent that 
hard-liners are able to maintain a state-of-siege mentality 
in which unity and conformity are the highest priorities, 
the Church’s divergent views could be presented as 
dangerous and intolerable.  If so, the newfound space could 
very likely be threatened and its proposals for change 
rejected.93 The Church seems to be preparing for a Cuba 
without Castro, a free Cuba. 
 
B. IMPACT ON CUBAN AND CHURCH INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Since the Papal visit, the United States has ignored 
the Pope’s request of ending the embargo.  As odd as it may 
sound, this will probably serve the Church’s purposes 
better in the long run.  By keeping the international trade 
restrictions on Cuba, the United States has created an 
atmosphere in which the Catholic Church is now welcomed 
with open arms.  As long as the embargo is in place, Castro 
must rely on the Church for socio-economic assistance and 
risk the secondary effects of losing popular influence to 
the Church. 
Being identified too closely with U.S. goals and 
interests could also damage the Church’s position.  One of 
the Cuban government’s tactics for delegitimating the 
dissident community has been to portray it as a tool of 
foreign interests, and the Church is potentially vulnerable 
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to the same criticism.94  Specifically, any 
misrepresentation of the Church’s agenda for peaceful 
change as an agenda of subversion could cause immense 
damage.  A stamp of approval from the United States could 
be the kiss of death on the island.95   
The other side of this coin is that the U.S.-Cuba 
dynamic, in which the Cuban government prefers to do 
precisely the opposite of what the U.S demands, could 
actually place the Church in an even more important 
position.  Being outside the tug-of-war between the two 
countries, the Church, and especially the Vatican, are much 
more acceptable interlocutors, to whom Castro is able to 
make concessions without losing face.  A request from the 
Pope provides political cover, both domestically and 
internationally, for actions that might otherwise be 
interpreted as capitulation to the United States.  To the 
extent that the government is already willing to consider 
certain changes, the Church may play an increasingly 
important role in negotiating them.  More than advocating 
change from an institutional level, the Church is currently 
sowing the seeds of change at an individual level and 
preparing to contribute to the process of change in a 
constructive way when it does occur. 
The Church in Cuba may also learn from the experiences 
of Roman Catholicism in communist Europe and in Latin 
America under military dictatorships.  In those settings, 
the Church welcomed many under its umbrella, enabling 
citizens to discuss freely within the public arena.  In 
that way, the Church enabled other social movements to act 
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toward democracy.  The past experiences of these countries 
may signal the future of Cuba.96   
The end of the Cold War was not, in and of itself, 
sufficient to allow the Catholic Church to enjoy the 
greater space that it has in Cuban society today.  I do, 
however, agree that that event was necessary for the 
refocusing of the Cuban government’s priorities within the 
international arena and the loosening of the Castro 
regime’s grip on society as a whole. 
Today fewer than 300 priests minister to the island’s 
220,000 active Catholics, about 2 percent of the 
population.  But the trend may be changing, the Pope spoke 
directly to the young people in Cuba not out of 
convenience, but most likely to ensure that the island has 
a new generation of clergy and administrators to carry the 
faith in a post-Castro Cuba.  
 
C. FINAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE VISIT 
 It would be extremely difficult to categorize exactly 
what some of the feelings that a single faithful Cuban 
Catholic may have experienced before, during, or after the 
Papal visit. But that does not mean that these individual 
experiences are necessarily meaningless.  For example, if 
only a portion of the message that the Pope espoused, “Do 
not be afraid”, was internalized amongst the population, 
and specifically the faithful, would it not be correct to 
assume that even this small and symbolic event was 
fruitful?  It would.   
 Pope John Paul II is revered by the over one billion 
Catholics as a great spiritual leader and symbol for peace 
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even in difficult times, but he cannot single-handedly 
change Cuba. It will take many steps, mostly small ones, in 
order to change the years of conditioning that the faithful 
have received by the regime. Just how large these small 
steps are will determine collectively how quickly the 

































































A. LEGACY OF THE PAPAL VISIT 
 The Papal visit has left the Catholic Church in Cuba 
in a strengthened position and with the support and 
solidarity of the universal Church.  Besides the 
government, the Church is the only nationwide organization 
in Cuba.  Its structure of parishes, dioceses, and 
provinces make it particularly effective.  The Church is 
now in a position to play a major role in any effort 
towards national reconciliation or a peaceful transition to 
democracy in Cuba.   
 Its success will depend to a large extent on how well 
the Church can prove to the Cuban people that it is not 
just looking for space for itself, but more importantly 
that it will champion the cause of human rights and basic 
freedoms for the Cuban people. 
 Gains are likely to continue into the future, but are 
intentionally being pursued in an incremental, sustainable 
manner that works within rather than against the existing 
system.  The Church seems to be preparing for a Cuba 
without Castro; a free Cuba.  In the meantime the Church is 
gaining space, an inch at a time, and building the moral 
and patriotic base on which the future Cuban republic will 
stand.     
Expecting the Catholic Church in Cuba to be the sole 
agent of change would not be realistic, even if that were 
its preference.  The Catholic Church will focus on certain 
issues and make their intentions and displeasures known 
regarding them.  At this initial stage, the church cannot, 
and probably will not be aggressive enough to demand 
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changes in other spheres of Cuban society.  It must now 
demonstrate a non-antagonistic character; much like an NGO, 
in order to continue to impress government officials that 
it is not interested in confrontation with the authorities 
and can be trusted to be a reliable intermediary. 
 
B. EMERGING CIVIL SOCIETY   
 In Cuba there is an emerging civil society comprised 
of independent journalists, economists, physicians, labor 
leaders, attorneys and common citizens.  Cuba’s certain but 
deferred transition to democracy will depend on the advance 
of all these groups.  With the deterioration of the Cuban 
economy and the pressure being exerted on the Cuban 
government by the international community to implement 
concrete changes, there now exists the opportunity for the 
opposition movement to become permanently established in 
Cuba.  This establishment in turn, will serve the ends of a 
peaceful transition to democracy and lay the foundation for 
the future civil society in Cuba. 
 On a larger scale, we can see that the grip of the 
state and the communist party has been loosening over Cuban 
society and economy.  That seemed to be the big story of 
the 1990’s and of which the Pope’s visit is now a part.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the 
Soviet subsidies to Cuba, and the consequent collapse of 
the Cuban economy, the Cuban government is decreasingly 
able to govern as it once did and as its leaders would 




C. FUTURE OF THE CHURCH    
The church clearly has far greater space in Cuban 
society at present than perhaps anyone would have thought 
possible even ten years ago.  Although that space exists 
largely at the discretion of the government and has not 
been truly consolidated on a permanent basis, progress is 
undeniable and prospects are good.  Small steps will 
eventually lead to a substantial lead in terms of 
preparation for the next government. 
The church is seeking more of a gradual evolution of 
freedoms, but not any radical changes in Cuba. Even given 
its limitations, the church could indeed be quite important 
to Cuba’s future.  As the most authentic non-governmental 
organization in the country and the only one with strong 
ties throughout the world, the church is positioned to 
facilitate peaceful change both within Cuba and in Cuba’s 
relations internationally.  What the Church accomplishes in 
Cuba when Castro is no longer in power will depend on the 
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